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Studies of opinion stability for small dynami networks with opportunisti agents
Pawel Sobkowiz
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∗
There are numerous examples of soieties with extremely stable mix of ontrasting opinions. We
argue that this stability is a result of an interplay between soiety network topology adjustment
and opinion hanging proesses. To support this position we present a omputer model of opinion
formation based on some novel assumptions, designed to bring the model loser to soial reality. In
our model, the agents, in addition to hanging their opinions due to inuene of the rest of soiety
and external propaganda, have the ability to modify their soial network, forming links with agents
sharing the same opinions and utting the links with those they disagree with. To improve the
model further we divide the agents into `fanatis' and `opportunists', depending on how easy is to
hange their opinions. The simulations show signiant dierenes ompared to traditional models,
where network links are stati. In partiular, for the dynamial model where inter-agent links are
adjustable, the nal network struture and opinion distribution is shown to resemble real world
observations, suh as soial strutures and persistene of minority groups even when most of the
soiety is against them and the propaganda is strong.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Ef, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.H
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer modeling of soial behavior is beoming in-
reasingly popular part of soiophysis, disipline om-
bining statistial methods and physial insights with so-
iologial observations. A reent review artile[1℄ lists
seventeen reasons for using suh models, the three top-
most being predition, explanation and guiding data ol-
letion. The models, optimally starting with simple, un-
derstandable and ommon sense premises should allow
us to understand at least some soial phenomena.
One of the diretions of suh researh is a study of
dynamis of opinion distribution in soieties. The litera-
ture on the subjet is quite rih, with several popular ap-
proahes, for example Sznajd model[2℄, Deuant model[3℄
or Krause-Hegelsmann model[4℄. Other approahes have
been proposed by Nowak and Latané[5℄ and Kaperski
and Hoªyst[6℄. Most of these and related works fous on
the mehanisms allowing the agents to ome to a om-
mon opinion, either via diret interations in enounters
between pairs of agents or through general inuene of
soiety as a whole. The soial struture itself may be
very dierent, from traditional one or two-dimensional
geometry to omplex networks. For a review of these
models see Ref. [7℄, for additional disussion of possible
diretions see also Ref. [8℄. The main interest of opinion
formation studies is in nding onditions whih lead to
a soiety reahing unanimous opinion, either via internal
interations or thanks to external inuenes. For this
reason the eld is often alled `onsensus formation'.
On the other hand, the real world examples of soieties
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where full onsensus is present are quite rare. In fat,
where important issues are at stake, we observe extremely
stable situations of opinion splits, ranging from relative
parity (for example in politial setup of many ountries)
to ongurations where small minority persists despite
strong soial pressures (for example in terrorist support
ases).
Our goal is to study opinion formation taking into a-
ount some proesses that are usually omitted, whih, in
our opinion play a ruial role in real soial situations and
inrease the the stability of split opinion ongurations.
We study hanges of opinion in onjuntion with other
proesses, suh as segregation. Current `standard' ap-
proahes to opinion formation modeling fous on hanges
of individual opinions due to enounters between agents.
It is surprising that the tendeny of voluntary soial sep-
aration due to attitude or opinion similarities and dier-
enes, well known and reorded even in a folklore (`birds
of a feather group together') has been negleted in opin-
ion simulations so far. Instead of the hoie of with-
standing the arguments of an opponent or surrendering
to them, most of us have the hoie of severing the re-
lationships with them. This results in relatively losed
sub-soieties, with little interation between them, espe-
ially when the issues under study are of ruial value. A
lassial example of soial modeling study invoking the
separation tendenies is the famous Shelling model of
soial segregation[9℄.
A novel aspet of the omputer model of opinion for-
mation presented here is that agents have the ability to
ut the soial links with those they disagree with and
form a new links with agents sharing the same opinion.
This hanges the network struture. To take into a-
ount the fat that in real soieties some links an not be
broken (e.g. family or work relationships) we have sim-
ulated situations where ertain perentage of the links
remain stati, while the rest are free, allowing hanges in
topology of the soial network.
2To keep the model simple, we have assumed binary
opinion values (+,−), whih may desribe some highly
ontested soial issues. Examples inlude politial pref-
erenes and opinions on topis suh as abortion or evolu-
tion. Within the model, the strength of inuene between
agents dereases with their soial separation, reeting
the fat that our opinions are swayed less by remote a-
quaintanes or strangers than by the losest assoiates.
Seondly, the opinion of a given agent may be hanged in
reation to pereived umulative soial opinion of others,
orresponding to properly averaged `peer pressure' rather
than the individual enounters. Many of the lassial
models have stressed the importane of suh individual
ontats in opinion hanges of agents, but in our belief
the onstant bakground of pereived opinions, resulting
from numerous meetings (not neessarily related to the
issue in question) and information on opinions held by
other soiety members is more relevant. In a way, this
an be desribed as eah agent ontinuously measuring
and responding to the `disomfort' due to dierene be-
tween its opinion and properly averaged opinions of other
agents. In addition to this intrinsi pressure we have
added simple parametrized external inuene, aimed to
desribe propagandist eorts.
As a further enhanement of the model, we have di-
vided the agents into two lasses: `fanatis' and `oppor-
tunists'. The only dierene is that it is relatively hard to
hange the opinion of a fanati. They orrespond to ore
`believers' in eah of the alternative opinions, for example
the extreme `pro-' or `anti-abortion' ativists or politial
party members. The opportunists orrespond to the soft
support base of a given opinion and exhibit muh greater
probability of `following the trend', adjusting their own
opinion to the pereived majority or to external propa-
ganda. We have assumed that the fanatis form a small
part of the soiety (10%), parameter whih is obviously
adjustable, and look for eets extending beyond their
number. One of the questions we have asked was when is
it possible that a set of fanatis holding a minority opin-
ion an inuene sizable number of supporters. This is
rather important in situations of terrorism, where the ex-
istene of the ore of ative terrorists depends on a wider
irle of supporters.
We have based our soial model on sale-free Albert-
Barabási (AB) networks. Suh networks reprodue an
important eet found in many natural and artiial sys-
tems, inluding soial relationships, namely the existene
of a large fration of very highly onneted network nodes
(for general reviews see, e.g. Refs. [10, 11, 12, 13℄). In
the AB networks the dispersion of the number of imme-
diate neighbors (degree distribution) sales aording to
power law rather than exponential or Gaussian. This
type of networks results from interplay of two proesses:
growth of the network and preferential attahment (the
`rih get riher' priniple). This proves to be very impor-
tant fator in opinion formation. Should `fanati' agents
be plaed in suh `positions of inuene', their impat on
the general behavior is more pronouned [14℄.
II. COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL
The main features of the model are as follows:
• A set of N interating agents forms a soiety. The
dynamis of the total system is assumed to take
plae through disrete time steps.
• Eah agent i has, at a given time, his `opinion' σ(i)
(+ or −). The initial number of + opinion hold-
ers, N ini+ is one of the ruial ontrol parameters
determining the results of the simulations.
• Some of the links are assumed to be stati, orre-
sponding to family or workplae onnetions, whih
are diult to break even if there is a dierene in
opinions of the onneted agents. The rest of the
links are free, and may be ut o when the opin-
ions of the agents are dierent. New links may form
between agents sharing the same opinion (and are
assumed to be free). To preserve the general net-
work properties the proess of destrution and re-
ation of links is performed in a way that keeps the
number of onnetions onstant.
• Eah agent is haraterized by its opportunism.
This is modeled via parameter ω(i) (0 ≤ ω(i) ≤ 1).
Small values of ω(i) orrespond to agents with low
probability of hanging their opinion under the in-
uene of others, or external inuenes  desribing
the `fanati' agents. High values of ω(i) orrespond
to `opportunisti' agents who readily hange their
opinion to join majority or follow external propa-
ganda. The model allows any distribution of ω(i),
but the results presented in this work were obtained
in a simple binary model, where the `fanatis' have
ω(i) = ωf and `opportunists' have ω(i) = ωo,
(ωf << ωo).
• Inuene of agents on other agents is governed by
their respetive opinions as well as on their soial
distane. We measure this distane simply via the
number of links separating the agents in the net-
work.
The simulation program onsists of the following major
steps:
1. Initial formation of a network, assignment of initial
opinion σ(i) and opportunism ω(i) values and ini-
tial assignment of the of stati and free status to
the links of the network. The average number of
links should be realisti, and for results presented
here we have hosen, on the average, 6 bidiretional
links per agent.
2. As the starting distribution of all the above men-
tioned parameters is random, it has little onne-
tion with real soieties, with their orrelated stru-
tures and patterns of opinions. To keep the model
loser to reality, we start with a relatively small
3number of iterations (< 5000), during whih the
agents adjust the network links but are not allowed
to hange their opinions. This produes soiety net-
work already separated due to dierenes in opin-
ions. Starting simulations with a random distribu-
tion (quite typial for many soial simulations) has
been found to give spurious results. For simulations
where all the links are assumed stati, this phase
simply does not hange anything.
3. The following, muh larger number of iterations
(< 200000), inludes two steps: possible opinion
hange for a randomly hosen agent and adjust-
ment of network onnetions by the same agent via
utting o or reation of a new link.
These two key proesses of the simulation are desribed
below.
For a randomly hosen `initializing' agent i we alulate
the network separation for all other agents and separate
them into four spheres S1, S2, S3 and S4. These are om-
posed of, respetively, the diret neighbors, the seond
neighbors, third neighbors and the rest of the soiety.
The strength of the inuene of an agent j on i depends
on the sphere that j belongs to. For eah agent j we al-
ulate also a modiation fator fσ(i, j), whih reets
our human tendeny to give more value to opinions of
those who agree with us and to give less redibility to
ontrary opinions. Thus fσ(i, j) = 2 if σ(i) = σ(j) and
fσ(i, j) = 1 otherwise.
For eah of the spheres SK we alulate the averaged,
normalized inuene over agent i
IK =
−
∑
j∈SK
fσ(i, j)σ(i)σ(j)∑
j∈SK
fσ(i, j)
(1)
The denominator ats to normalize IK , so that if all
agents j within SK disagree with i, then IK is at the
upper limit of IK = 1 and if all agents in SK agree whit
i then IK = −1.
The overall inuene of the soiety on agent i is then
alulated as a weighted sum of IK . To reet the obser-
vation that lose aquaintanes have muh more inuene
than strangers we have assigned geometrially dereasing
weights, for the spheres of inreasing distane. The total
inuene of the soiety on agent i is
s(i) =
4∑
K=1
IKd
(K−1) 1− d
1− d4
, (2)
where d < 1 and the last fator serves to provide normal-
ization. In this work we have used d = 0.5 and d = 0.3,
whih orrespond, respetively, to 53% and 70.5% of the
weight of the inuene originating from the immediate
sphere of neighbors S1.
In addition to soial pressure we s(i), we have inluded
a simple model for external inuene h(i) = −hσ(i), due
to media, propaganda or ultural traditions. Here, h is a
simple numerial parameter, whih, along with the N ini+
is one of the key ontrols of the simulated system.
The initializing agent i hanges its opinion with prob-
ability of p(i) = (s(i) + h(i))ω(i). Obviously, when the
sum of s(i)+h(i) is lower than zero, there is no hane of
opinion hange. This orresponds naturally to a situation
where enough agents agree with i (making the s(i) nega-
tive), and when the external inuene has the same sign
as σ(i). Conversely, p(i) may beome positive if enough
agents disagree with i (espeially agents lose to it, from
the nearest spheres of inuene) or if a strong external
propaganda has the opposite sign than i's opinion.
It is worth noting that in this model, we take into
aount inuenes of all soiety members, saled down in
value aordingly to their distane from the initializing
agent. The individual ontributions of agents belonging
to S4 sphere are very small, due to normalization within
the sphere and then to the geometri derease fator for
the sphere itself. They form an averaged bakground
to more varied loal inuenes of neighbors from losest
spheres.
The seond step in simulations is the modiation of
network onnetions. To maintain the number of links
onstant we have alternated utting and adding links.
The rst of these proesses is very simple. Keeping the
previously hosen agent i, we pik another, `target' agent
t randomly from the set of nearest neighbors that disagree
with i. The link between i and t is then ut o. Obvi-
ously, if all i's neighbors agree with it, then we move to
next simulation round.
Creating new links is more omplex. The target agent t
is not hosen totally at random among the spheres S2, S3
and S4, but rather with probability dereasing on soial
distane between i and t. This probability for agent t
belonging to sphere SK (K > 1) around i is given by
p(t) =
A
NagrK
(
1
2
)K−1
, (3)
where NagrK is the number of agents in the SK sphere
who agree with i and A is a global normalization fa-
tor to ensure that
∑
t p(t) = 1. The (1/2)
K−1
fator
leads to a probability of forming a new ling with agents
from further spheres dereasing geometrially. Again, we
hose this form for oneptual simpliity, with the aim
of getting a simple equivalent to the observations that
we meet more often with our lose soial neighbors. The
newly formed link between i and t is treated as a free one.
The resulting network preserves, with only minor devi-
ations, the general degree distribution harateristi for
AB networks. However, the proess leads very quikly to
separation of subnetworks of + and − opinion holders if
the free links are dominant. The nal shape of suh sep-
arated network resembles very muh some distributions
found in soial studies. While the average number of links
per agent remains unhanged and only minor hanges in
degree distribution are observed, other relevant network
properties hange radially, for example the shortest path
4distribution and lustering oeient. This is espeially
important when all the links are free, beause + and −
opinion holders segregate to separate ommunities. If
we alulate the network properties of these ommuni-
ties separately, then in the ase of large majority we ob-
serve that there is similarity to the original onguration
in suh harateristis as lustering oeient. On the
other hand, the minority has muh larger fration of dis-
onneted agents, so that there is signiant dierene in
related network harateristis.
The omputer program used for the simulations stores
the vital soiety parameters (suh as N+), numbers of
links between various types of agents, umulative number
of opinion hanges and rewiring events. We also reord
spei network data at the beginning of the iterations,
at the point when the initial phase of network segregation
ends and at the end of the simulation. The number of it-
erations has been hosen in a way to provide a stabilized
onguration, by diret monitoring the number of opin-
ion swithes and network rewires per 10000 individual
steps. It should be noted that thanks to fored nature of
rewiring, this part of the proess is muh faster than the
opinions hange. For moderate values of of we observe
also small `asades' of hanges brought by `onversion'
of a fanati.
III. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The simulations presented in this paper are run with
relatively small artiial soieties of 500 agents. This lim-
itation dereases, obviously, the value of our results for
general soieties. We believe, however, that even small
simulation sizes might be found useful to desribe at least
some soial situations, suh as loal ommunities or ad-
ho virtual groups found frequently on the Internet. We
have used the average of 6 diret links per agent, and var-
ied the proportion of stati (S) and free (F ) links, thus a
notation F = 2, S = 4 would denote simulation with, on
average, there would be 2 freely re-linkable onnetions
and 4 unhangeable ones per agent. Of ourse, by the
very nature of AB networks, there would be agents with
signiantly more onnetions.
Our rst observation was that for some range of sim-
ulation parameters, the results of individual runs were
quite unpreditable. When the simulations stabilized the
system often ended up in ongurations where the basi
property N+ varied greatly. For a wide range of exter-
nal inuene values and the initial split of opinions N ini+ ,
the nal soiety ould ontain 300 N+ agents, or, in an-
other run, it ould end up with 490 suh agents out of
500. These dierenes were traed down to partiular
alloation of positions of fanati agents, espeially when
they initially oupied sites of high onnetivity. We have
welomed this unpreditability of the simulations at the
level of individual runs as a sign that the model has some
hanes to provide insights into real soieties, where in-
dividual hoies and varying inuenes may have great
impat on general soiety situation.
The similarity with reality is largely due to the dy-
nami nature of the network, allowing the strutures to
adjust to opinions rather than foring the opinions to ad-
just to the network struture. One an ompare a typial
outome of a simulation that resulted in a mixed opinion
soiety with data on blogging behavior in strongly polar-
ized environment of US 2004 eletions, whih has been
published by Adami and Glane[15℄. The observed link-
ing patterns between the blogs is almost idential to those
obtained in our simulations in the ase when all links are
free for rewiring. It is worth noting that blogging is a
perfet example of soial network where suh freedom of
assoiation and disassoiation is present, without restri-
tions imposed by workplae, family of geographial on-
straints. The opposing groups beome nearly separated,
with very few links between them. Even in the ase when
some stati links are present, (for example S = 2, F = 4)
the separation of the groups is very strong.
Beause the results of individual simulations were quite
unpreditable, we have onentrated on the statistial
properties of the simulation outomes. The basi mea-
sured quantity was the nal number of + agents, N+.
We have looked for onditions under whih the soiety
would exhibit mixed opinions and for onditions of nal
uniformity or near uniformity (either almost all + or al-
most all −). In partiular, we were looking for onditions
supporting highly asymmetri ongurations, for exam-
ple N+ = 420, when a small number of − fanatis ould
be `surrounded' by some opportunist followers  situa-
tion orresponding to many important soial issues, suh
as support for extremist views.
The main ontrol parameters were the initial number of
+ opinion holders, N ini+ , the external inuene h and the
ratio between the average number of stati (S) and free
links (F ) per agent. In addition to N+, we have studied
the rate of onvergene, the distribution of opinions for
the opportunisti and fanati agents, and averages of the
numbers of links between various types of agents.
Aumulation of results of thousands of individual sim-
ulations has revealed some surprising patterns in the sys-
tem behavior. Figure 2 presents probability distribu-
tions of simulated soieties for various ombinations of
free and stati links and for external inuene h = 0,
ωf = 0.02, ωo = 0.9 and d = 0.5. Gray density orre-
sponds to relative probability of nding a simulation end-
ing with a partiular value ofN+ for a simulation starting
with a given N ini+ value. Let us start with the `tradi-
tional' model, in whih the network struture is frozen
(lower right panel, F = 0, S = 6). As we an see, the
mixed soiety prevails only for a very limited range of
initial values of N ini+ , between 230 and 270. Any larger
asymmetry in the initial distribution leads to soieties
with uniform distribution, favoring the initial majority.
In the entral region, the nal distribution has a strong
variane, but the peak of the distribution lies along a
line with a slope of 5/3. The transition between the
mixed and uniform solutions is rather abrupt, suggest-
5FIG. 1: Example of a network in a model soiety, with relatively few links between them. We have used automati program
algorithm optimizing agent positioning, whih resulted in a lear division between the agents with + and − opinions. Darker
irled denote the fanatis, and the size of the irles orresponds to number of the links of an agent. This simulation orresponds
almost ideally to observations of politial behavior desribed by Adami and Glane.
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FIG. 2: Probability distributions of nal N+ values as funtions of their initial number N
ini
+ for external inuene h = 0.0
. The panels orrespond to various mix of average free and stati links per agent. The simulations started with the number
of fanati agents making on average 10% of the given starting value of + and − agents. The fanatis had medium swithing
probability of ωf = 0.02 and d = 0.5 (meaning that roughly 50% of the soial inuene was due to nearest neighbors).
6ing a phase transition between the random, mixed state
and a full onsensus.
When we turn to the opposite end of the network ex-
ibility, namely the simulations where every link is free to
be ut (upper left panel, F = 6, S = 0), we see a totally
dierent behavior. First observation is that the results
of the simulations show muh less variane between runs.
But more important is the fat that for almost the whole
range of starting onditions the soiety omposition re-
mains almost unhanged during the `opinion swithing',
N+ ≈ N
ini
+ . Thanks to separation of the opposing agents
during the preparatory phase, even the inuene of a
large majority is weakened by soial distane introdued
by the severed links.
The two intermediate ases (F = 2, S = 4 and F =
4, S = 2) are similar to the stati soiety. The points of
transition to uniform opinion distribution shift to more
extreme values of N ini+ with inreasing fration of free
links, but still the absene of nal ongurations with a
large majority/small minority is lear.
To show how this behavior is inuened by the simula-
tion parameters we present results obtained for a smaller
value of d = 0.3. Suh hoie leads to muh higher inu-
ene of immediate neighbors. Moreover, we hanged the
ωf value to 0.000001, making it virtually impossible to
swith the opinion of a fanati. We have also hanged the
proedure for initial assignment of opinions of fanatis.
In the previously presented simulations the initial num-
ber of fanatis with a given opinion was taken as 10%
of the general initial assignement (i.e. for N ini+ = 100
there were, on average 10 + fanatis). Here, regardless
of the N ini+ , we kept a onstant number of 25 + fanatis
and the same for their − ounterparts. The aim of this
hange was to study the eets that a sizeable number of
fanatis may have on a soiety, even if their opinion are
not supported by opportunisti
The overall hanges brought by these adjustments were
quite interesting (Fig. 3). The two limiting (all-free and
all-stati) ases retained their harateristis. The lin-
ear behavior of the F = 6 ase is well preserved, as is
the rapid transition in the F = 0 ase. The hange in
the values of N+ in the `onsensus' regime was due to
minority fanatis who, by design, did not hange their
opinions, but who did not have any supporters.
The most interesting was the intermediate ongura-
tion with F = 4. Inreasing the role of the nearest neigh-
bors has led to hange from disontinuous behavior to
a ontinuous one. The stronger inuene of immediate
neighborhood and apability to adjust, on average, 66%
of the links, resulted in soieties where in addition to fa-
natis, some other agents ould keep their minority opin-
ions.
The next set of results (Fig. 4) presents simulations
where external inuene was present (h = 0.5). The rest
of the simulation parameters was idential to those pre-
sented in Fig. 2. For the F = 6 ase, the presene of
positive inuene has stabilized the initial distribution
for small values of N ini+ , while at the same time broaden-
ing the distribution of possible outomes for N ini+ > 300,
where simulation outomes between N ini+ and 500 were
possible. It should be noted, however, that in this ase is
was still possible to nd nal soieties starting with a mi-
nority of a 100 − agents and ending with a similar value,
despite being outnumbered and under external inuene.
For the ases where at least some of the links were
stati, the general opinion followed the external inuene
for a broad range of starting onditions. For networks
with mixed free and stati links the ranges of nonuniform
opinion results were shifted to smaller starting values of
N ini+ , and the transitions to onsensus were abrupt. In
the ase of a fully stati network, the external inuene
was too weak to break negative onsensus for starting
onditions where there were more than 400 agents with
negative opinions at the starting point. Only for a very
narrow range of onditions we observed mixed opinion
state, and above N ini+ = 140 a positive onsensus pre-
vailed.
To test the importane of the external inuenes we
have run a series of simulations keeping the initial num-
ber of + agents onstant (using slightly asymmetri value
of N ini+ = 200), but with dierent values of h, between
0 and 1. Results are presented in Fig. 5. For fully exi-
ble network, the nal omposition was remarkably stable
against the external inuene. Its eets beame visible
above h = 0.6 and around h = 0.8 led to swift transition
to onsensus state. With inreasing ratio of xed links
the region of stability has been redued, but still the aver-
age nal omposition of the soiety remained almost un-
hanged for a broad range of external propaganda. This
is in ontrat with the fully stati, traditional network
model, where the range of values leading to mixed soi-
ety was very narrow.
IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELS OF
CONSENSUS ON DYNAMIC NETWORKS
Reently there is inreasing interest on opinion model-
ing on dynami soial strutures, as opposed to more
traditional stati ones. There are numerous exam-
ples of related works, using dierent soial networks
and, importantly, dierent models for opinion hange
of individual agents. Examples of suh works are pro-
vided by Holme and Newman[16℄, Kozma, Barrat and
Nardini[17, 18℄, Vazquez, Eguíluz and SanMiguel[19℄ and
Fu and Wang[20℄. In these works, in eah iteration, an
agent with ertain probability φ would adjust its opinion
(in aordane with the hosen model) and with proba-
bility 1−φ would ut one of the links with a neighbor of a
dierent opinion. All the ited works start with random
networks. The dierenes in approahes lie partially in
the rewiring proess and partially in the opinion model.
In [[16, 17, 18℄℄ and [[19℄℄ the new links are formed to ran-
dom agents, while in [20℄ there is preferene for the next
nearest neighbors (S2 in our notation). Muh greater
dierenes are in the opinion desriptions. In [[16, 20℄℄
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FIG. 3: Probability distributions of nal N+ values as funtions of their initial number N
ini
+ for external inuene h = 0.0 .
The panels orrespond to various mix of average free and stati links per agent. The simulations started with xed number of
25 fanati + agents, with very low swithing probability of ωf = 0.000001 and d = 0.3 (meaning that roughly 70% of the soial
inuene was due to nearest neighbors).
there are multiple opinion values, and the nal state of
the system is a set of separated opinion islands, eah or-
responding to a given value of opinion. While Holme and
Newman[16℄ use very simplisti rule, in whih the initi-
ating agent simply takes the opinion of the target agent,
Fu and Wang[20℄ use majority rule among nearest neigh-
bors. The remaining works model opinions via the Voter
model ([18, 19℄) or Deuant bounded ondene model
([17℄).
Compared to these works the main new fators bought
by our approah are in the opinion dynamis. While
the eets of network hanges, leading to separation of
agents holding diering opinions are generally similar,
the inlusion of weighted inuene by the whole soi-
ety marks a signiant hange from the fous on individ-
ual onvergene of opinions. We admit, that the spei
form of splitting the soiety and assignment of weights to
agents in various groups through soial distane is arbi-
trary and more omplex than in the individual enounter
models. Yet there is, in our opinion, a strong motivation
for making this eort, based on observations of rarity
of situations when people hange their opinions due to
individual enounters. In fat, there are stable soial
networks based on purely negative onnetions, where
repeated ontats lead to entrenhment in the opposing
opinions without any hane of lessening dierenes of
opinions[21℄. We hope that the ontrol parameters, even
though more numerous, have more diret orrespondene
to fators measurable by soiologists.
Obviously the rst important fator is the ratio of free
to stati links. The works we referred to in this se-
tion use assumption that all the links an be rewired,
whih is obviously in disagreement with many soial sit-
uations. It is worth noting that reently Lambiotte and
Ausloos[22℄ have proposed a majority rule based model
on stati oupled random networks. Suh networks bear
lose resemblane to the nal state of our rewiring pro-
ess, and the authors have studied dependene of the
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FIG. 4: Probability distributions of nal N+ values as funtions of their initial number N
ini
+ for external inuene h = 0.5 .
The panels orrespond to various mix of average free and stati links per agent. The simulations used the same parameters ad
Fig. 2.
outomes on the ratio of links onneting the oupled
random subnetworks. Despite dierent opinion swith-
ing model, the results are lose to those obtained by us,
namely, it is possible to retain mixed opinion state only
when the number of links between the subnetworks is
suiently small (in our language, if S is small).
Another example of the value of the extended model is
in the role of parameter d, whih determines the relative
role of the losest neighborhood on soial inuene. As
we observed, dereasing d (whih means that the role of
the nearest neighbors is higher) brings more stability to
asymmetri ongurations with large majority and small
minority. On the other hand, when the value of d is
inreased, for example to 0.99 (when the inuene of eah
SK sphere is roughly idential) or to d = 1.84, when half
of the inuene originated from the most remote parts
of the soiety, the system behavior starts to resemble
losely situation with signiant number of xed links
(see Fig. 6). This is understandable beause S4 inuene
is eetive whether there is separation between the two
subnetworks or not. Thus the parameters' role is, to
ertain degree, interhangeable.
The last of the elements inuening the whole system is
the presene and number of fanatis. In a reent preprint,
Galam[23℄ has used similar onept of `inexible agents'.
It is interesting, however, that within his model, whih
does not allow soial network modiation, even inlu-
sion of small number of fanatis against huge majority
favoring the other opinion would eventually lead to the
whole population aligned with the fanatis. As we have
shown, the oupling of the presene of fanatis and the
ative status of the network leads, at best, to the ontin-
ued existene of minorities, but never to the `ditatorial
mahine' of dominating minority.
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FIG. 5: Probability distributions of nal N+ values as funtions of external inuene for various ratios of F and S, and for
starting value of N
ini
+ = 200. Simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.
V. COMPARISON WITH REAL WORLD
PHENOMENA
For omparison with real world data we have hosen
opinions on the severity of threat posed by global warm-
ing (Fig. 7). The presented data are based on CBS polls
(http://www.bsnews.om/stories/2007/10/12/politis/main3362530.shtml)
and Gallup data[24℄. The relative stability of the number
of `global warming deniers' is espeially interesting in
the light of the massive amounts of propaganda on the
subjet. The growth of awareness (shown in the third
panel of Fig. 7) does not seem to lead to a onsensus.
One of the reasons might be the hasm separating the
two groups. This is visible, for example in the studies
of the reations to the environmental propaganda[24℄.
While on average 41% of Gallup respondents think that
the seriousness of the global warming is exaggerrated
(perentage whih grew from 30% in 2006), the ratio is
only 22% for Demorat supporters and 66% for Repub-
lians. As we have seen, the links between these two
amps are largely broken, so the situation orresponds at
least partially to our model. Even in sienti analyses
of global warming, a lot of disussions related to impor-
tane of human driven fators in the limate hange are
often shifted to emotional grounds and arguments ad-
personam. As a result, the gap between the ommunities
only broadens, with eah of the groups following their
own gurus and leaders, without any eets of gradual
onsensus building. We expet that the `deniers' would
be present in soieties even when overwhelming, diret
evidene will aumulate, lustering among any evidene
pointing to natural origins of the limate hanges and
distrusting all other information soures.
It is interesting that Galam[23℄ uses global warming as
a test ase for his model (whih, as already noted, does
inlude fanatis but no dynami network hanges). By
putting sientists (or people who laim that there is si-
enti proof for human ulpability for the phenomenon)
in the role of the fanatis, he predits that there are on-
ditions under whih we would ahieve a total vitory of
this opinion. Thus, the two models predit signiantly
dierent outomes. The observed stability of the global
10
F
in
a
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
N
+
a
g
en
ts
Initial number of + agents, N ini
+
F = 6, S = 0, d = 0.3
F
in
a
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
+
a
g
en
ts
,
N
+
Initial number of + agents, N ini
+
F = 6, S = 0, d = 0.5
F
in
a
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
+
a
g
en
ts
,
N
+
Initial number of + agents, N ini
+
F = 6, S = 0, d = 0.99
F
in
a
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
+
a
g
en
ts
,
N
+
Initial number of + agents, N ini
+
F = 6, S = 0, d = 1.84
FIG. 6: Probability distributions of nal N+ values as funtions of parameter d for networks with only free links. The
simulations started with xed number of 25 fanati + agents, with very low swithing probability of ωf = 0.000001. Low values
of d orrespond to high importane of nearest neighbors, while for d = 0.99 about 25% of the inuene omes from the eah of
the SK spheres. For d = 1.84 the opposite eet is in fore: 50% of the inuene omes from S4, i.e. furthest strangers.
warming deniers shows, in our opinion, the importane
of the voluntary separation on general opinion statistis.
Another example of a stable, highly polarized opinion
split is provided by pro-hoie and pro-life approahes
to abortions. The perentages of those supporting and
rejeting abortion rights in the US remains almost un-
hanged for the past 12 years, as doumented by the
CBS polls. Espeially interesting are data from two polls
from 1998. The rst indiated that 44% of respondents
thought that people advoating making all abortions il-
legal are unreasonable extremists. This would make the
expetation for ahieving onsensus minimal. Indeed, in
another poll, 88% of respondents did not believe that the
disagreement shall ever be resolved. While these data are
based on US statistis, the Polish soiety is equally split
both in opinions and in the ability to form any ommu-
niation hannel between the two amps, whih simply
throw abuse at the other's positions. Ahieving opinion
onsensus in suh ase is, indeed, quite impossible.
Important examples of the stability of mixed opinion
may be provided by the situations of intense soial on-
it (suh as Afghanistan or Northern Ireland) where de-
spite the eorts for reoniliation, the existene of small
number of fanatis and ut-o of links between the pro-
ponents of oniting views results in almost unbreak-
able deadlok. The simple model used in our simulations
shows how probable are soieties where a small number
of fanatis an attrat enough supporters to provide self-
sustained sub-ommunities, separated from the rest of
soiety. It would be very interesting to see studies of real
soial links in these ommunities, espeially for the peri-
ods when the violene was signiantly redued, as was
the ase of Northern Ireland.
An interesting analysis of opinion formation showing
persistene of opinions despite massive propaganda eort
has been presented by Wragg[25℄. His analysis of support
for polio vaination in Uttar Pradesh rural ommuni-
ties ombines soial distane (in Nowak-Latané spatial
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FIG. 7: Evolution of opinions on global warming in US, aording to CBS polls. The stability of the minority view, espeially
in the light of massive publi propaganda is remarkable.
model) and fators related to group separation due to
religion. Key fator in refusal of vaination has been
attributed to rumors among the Muslim part of the pop-
ulation that the vainations were designed to sterilize
Muslim hildren as part of a well-disguised form of geno-
ide implemented by the Hindu-dominated Indian Health
Department. The split between religious groups has af-
feted the aeptane this rumor, and subsequently, the
reations to vaination ampaigns.
Due to limitations of ompute power, our simulations
were limited to small networks (500 agents). However,
even suh size might be relevant and ompared with prop-
erly hosen soial observations. Examples of small, rela-
tively isolated ommunities are numerous. For example,
one ould onsider reations of ompany workers to polit-
ial issues (suh as the lassial study of Berelson, Lazars-
feld, and MPhee[26℄, where analysis of voter o-workers
and friends shows signiant preferene for same-opinion
links[27℄) or, even more interestingly to vital ompany is-
sues, suh as privatisation of state enterprises. Or, look-
ing for more exibility in link formation and destrution,
to study internet soial networks. More traditional lo-
al ommunities, espeially in rural areas, oer similar
sale and the issues in question might involve adoption
of innovations or politial or ethial issues  subjet of
extensive study in soiology.
The persistene of minority groups, separated from the
rest of soiety is observed on many oasions. It plays es-
peially important role in areas of soial onit, where
the onsequenes of opinion split are often disastrous,
leading to terrorism. The separation between minority
opinion holders and the majority results in inability to
onvine them and to separate the more exible mem-
bers of the minority from the fanatis. For these reasons
we believe that the urrent model, stressing the dynami
nature of soial bonds and interations an reprodue
opinion formation in many soial situations. While the
fat that there are relatively many ontrol parameters
might seem as a disadvantage of the model, we believe
that they an be derived from diret soial researh for
spei ommunities and situations. Suh experimental
determination is possible for group size, average number
of links, ratio of free and stati links or the degree distri-
bution. Also the tendeny to at as the `fanatis' is mea-
surable via interviews, giving the estimates for oo and of .
Similarly, the parameter d ould be estimated from the
way people assign importane to opinions of their lose
aquaintanes and to more remote parts of soiety. As
a result, the additional omplexity of the model might
be less daunting that it initially looks, and allow spei
preditions for onrete soial situations, something that
is diult in the simpler approahes. We would be most
interested in soial studies orresponding to the modeled
situations, as the proof of the model lies only in its abil-
ity to reet reality. Future diretions of our researh
inlude simulations with muh larger soieties and simu-
lations where a soiety omposition resulting from a sim-
ulation is destabilized by signiant hange of external
inuenes.
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